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THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN THE
INTERNET AGE:




Does Internet voting violate the Voting Rights Act? When,
how, and why might it do so, and if it did, what else would? As the
only participant in this Symposium on Internet Voting and Democ-
racy whose day job is Voting Rights Act litigation, I feel obligated to
turn to these questions. But I think they carry implications for voting
rights enforcement that reach beyond the new voting technology that
is the subject of our Symposium; in fact, they turn out to raise diffi-
cult questions of the meaning of the Voting Rights Act and its stan-
dards for liability.
So, at the risk of descending into a doctrinal morass that only a
voting rights lawyer could love, I will try in this Article to deal with
some of those questions, and will focus particularly on a core con-
cept that seems to have received too little attention from courts and
commentators: the race-based denial of equal access to the ballot-
casting process. For it is this denial of access, not the more often
litigated dilution of minority voting strength, that I think explains
how the Voting Rights Act should treat online voting-and not only
* Attorney, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of
Justice; adjunct professor, George Washington University Law School. The
opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author in his personal capac-
ity and do not represent the views or policies of the Justice Department, the
Civil Rights Division, or the Voting Section. For help with this Article the
author is indebted to the other contributors to Loyola's Internet Voting and
Democracy Symposium, and to Michelle Aronowvitz, Neil Bradley, Jon Green-
baum, Chris Herren, Gerry Hebert, Peyton McCrary, Laughlin McDonald,
Tom Reed, Joe Rich, and Dana Shelley.
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that, provocative procedural innovation, but at least two more familiar
practices that are among the liveliest current topics in American
voting rights law: the disenfranchisement of felons, and the racially
disparate use of error-prone conventional voting equipment.
The short answer to our opening questions is this: the racially
selective distribution of benefits or burdens with respect to the act of
voting might very well violate section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, by
denying racial minorities equal access to the political process-even
if the selectivity is not the demonstrable result of discriminatory in-
tent, and even if it does not measurably affect a minority group's
ability to influence or control the outcome of elections.
Internet voting has not yet been tried in a binding general elec-
tion for public office in the United States. The only binding public
election yet held anywhere in the nation that included Internet voting
as an option for all voters was the Arizona Democratic Presidential
Preference primary of March 7-11, 2000. That election is the focus
of Professors Alvarez and Nagler in one of the Symposium's princi-
pal papers.' I set out here some details of this election for illustrative
purposes.
For the Arizona Democratic presidential primary in March 2000,
Internet voting was one of three voting methods used; the other two
were vote-by-mail and in-person balloting.2 The state Democratic
Party, which ran the primary without funding from the state, mailed a
packet to all voters on its master list of registered Democrats about
three weeks before primary day, which was about two weeks before
early voting (and Internet voting) began.3 The mail packet included
an Internet voting "certificate," with a password for each individual
voter that was essential to gain access to the Internet voting site. The
packet also included an application for a mail-in ballot, and a
1. See R. Michael Alvarez & Jonathan Nagler, The Likely Consequences
of Internet Voting for Political Representation, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1115,
1135-48 (2001).
2. See id. at 1136.
3. See id. at 1137.
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letter explaining the three voting methods to be used for the 2000
presidential primary-Internet, mail, and in-person.4
The party arranged for in-person voting at more locations than
had been used for the most recent previous Arizona Democratic
presidential primary in 1996. The party claimed that a number of
additional polling places were open, particulary "in or near" Indian
reservations. 5 Shortly before the primary, the party added some ad-
ditional Election Day polling sites at or near reservation popula-
tions.6 The party permitted mail-in ballots to be sent in anytime until
the close of the polls on election night. The Internet site for online
voting was made available for four days up to and including the day
set for in-person balloting.7
There was no restriction on the location of Internet voting sites;
every registered Democrat in Arizona who received an Internet vot-
ing password could cast a vote over the Internet from any computer
in the world for four days before primary day.8 Thus, for those vot-
ers whom the state Democratic Party's master registration list in-
cluded and whom the mails did not miss, and who had access to the
Internet anytime during the four-day window, the bonds of time and
geography were made looser than even traditional early voting or ab-
sentee voting could make them.
The party's procedures permitted in-person voters to vote at any
polling station in the state regardless of their assigned precinct.
9
They also permitted late or same-day registration, although voters
registered after January 22, 2000, had to vote by paper ballot.'0 In
theory, Internet-ready computers were provided for every election
day polling site.
1'
The scheme as a whole increased significantly the convenience
of voting for those with ready access to the Internet and familiarity
4. See id. at 1136-37. The time provided-about seventeen days-may
not have been enough to allow voters to mail back the application, receive a
ballot by mail, and return it in time to be counted.
5. See id.
6. See id.
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with its use-call these voters "Internet-capable" or "Internet-
privileged." At the same time, the new scheme somewhat, but not as
greatly, increased the convenience of voting by traditional means
when compared with the 1996 Arizona Democratic presidential pri-
mary. It also greatly increased voting opportunities for all voters
when compared with the limited caucus procedure the Party used to
select its choice for president in elections before that. According to
Alvarez and Nagler, the plan seems to have boosted turnout mark-
edly, especially considering the minimal significance of the Arizona
primary to the outcome of the 2000 Democratic presidential nomi-
nating process. 12 The plan also apparently made turnout in the pri-
mary whiter, as well as younger and better educated, than it would
have been had the Internet voting option not been offered.
1 3
Stated briefly, the section 2 access question presented on these
facts is whether an innovation that makes voting more convenient, or
more easily accessible, to some but not all voters introduces an unac-
ceptable disparity into the voting process. Under section 2, if the set
of those who enjoy the enhancement are more heavily white than
those who do not, a fact finder must determine whether the level of
convenience still available to the "have-nots" is sufficient that any
gap between them and the "haves" is immaterial. Other section 2 is-
sues are raised if and to the extent that the racial composition of the
Election Day electorate is changed. 14
For purposes of determining inequalities of access under section
2, a convenience or benefit to voting should be no different from a
burden or other imposition on that activity. A benefit or burden is
meaningfully maldistributed by race when it results in demonstrable
relative hardship to minority voters even without an effect on turnout
or election results-for example, even if those visited with the
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1142-43 tbl.6.
14. Alvarez and Nagler's principal effort is to estimate the effect of Internet
voting on the composition of the electorate for the 2000 Arizona Democratic
presidential primary. See id. at 1117-18. Understandably, the focus of Alvarez
and Nagler's work is on changes in the electorate that could affect the outcome
of the election; but although proof of such changes would most likely be re-




disadvantage generally manage to overcome it and negate any turn-
out effect that might otherwise result.1
5
II. DENIAL AND DILUTION
A. The Problem Introduced
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 began its career at a great mo-
ment in our civil rights history 6 by outlawing at a stroke a vast array
of exclusionary laws, pretexts, and devices that had kept political
participation by nonwhites almost nonexistent across the American
South since the turn of the twentieth century.' 7 The law achieved
part of its purpose almost immediately: rates of black voter registra-
tion and voting shot up across the nation, but especially in the states
of the old Confederacy.1 8 As is well known, of course, so did rates
of the use of new devices-chiefly new methods of election-that
effectively cancelled out much of the rise in minority voter
15. See id. at 1128 (unfairness of a disadvantage is not necessarily negated
because those on whom it is imposed manage to overcome it).
16. See Lyndon B. Johnson's Special Message to the Congress on the Right
to Vote, 108 PUB. PAPERS 1 (Mar. 15, 1965), available at
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.homspeeches.hom1650315.htm
("I speak tonight for the dignity of man and the destiny of democracy .... At
times history and fate meet at a single time in a single place to shape a turning
point in man's unending search for freedom... So it was last week in Selma,
Alabama .... The cries of pain and the hymns and protests of oppressed peo-
ple have summoned into convocation all the majesty of this great Government.
... Our lives have been marked with debate about great issues... [b]ut rarely
in any time does an issue lay bare the secret heart of America itself.... The
issue of equal rights for American Negroes is such an issue. And should we
defeat every enemy, should we double our wealth and conquer the stars, and
still be unequal to this issue, then we will have failed as a people and as a na-
tion.").
17. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445,
amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973bb-1 (1994); see also Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-51 (1966) (discussing the basic test to be applied
under the Fifteenth Amendment); JEROME J. HANUS ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, AS AMENDED:
HISTORY, EFFECTS, AND ALTERNATIVES 1-21 (1975).
18. See James E. Alt, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and
White Voter Registration in the South, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH:
1965-1990, at 351, 366 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofrnan eds., 1994).
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participation. 19 In 1969, four years after the Act was passed, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Allen v. State Board of Elections that the most
artful of those new devices-the systematic dilution of the voting
power of racial minorities by means of changes to election systems-
could be just as unlawful as the traditional, if now slowly abating,
physical exclusion of minority voters from the nation's polling
places.
20
Since Allen, the Voting Rights Act's core prohibition on racial
discrimination in voting has undergone a number of reinterpretations,
most of which have concerned the scope of liability and remedies for
unlawful dilution of minority voting power when equality of physical
access is nominally unimpaired. In the vote dilution hubbub of the
last twenty years-from City of Mobile v. Bolden2 1 to the 1982
amendments to the Act, 22 to Thornburg v. Gingles,23 Johnson v. De
Grandy,24 and Holder v. Hall,25 to Shaw v. Reno,2 6 Miller v. John-
son,27 and Bossier Parish School Board v. Reno -- courts and advo-
cates seem to have largely overlooked the power of the Act to ad-
dress many forms of inequality of access to the electoral process in
addition to vote dilution.
Vote dilution, simply defined, is a disproportionate reduction in
the voting power of one segment of the electorate relative to that of
another segment. This is generally a function, not just of the power
of larger groups of voters to outvote smaller ones, but of the ten-
dency of certain majority voting blocs to suppress, systematically
and over time, the expression of the minority's preference. A racial
vote dilution claim under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a
claim that votes cast by racial minority voters as a group are
19. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 563-71 (1969) (de-
scribing various election methods).
20. See id. at 569 ("The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting
power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.").
21. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
22. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 97-227 (1981);
S. REP. No. 97-417 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177-248.
23. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
24. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
25. 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
26. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
27. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
28. No. 98-405 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2000) (Bossier II).
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mathematically diluted or rendered less effective than the votes of
whites, i.e., that minority voters are deprived of the same chance as
whites to elect their preferred candidates even when every other as-
pect of the system is "working," or delivering to all voters an essen-
tially equal opportunity to participate.29 But the immediate goal of
equal opportunity to cast votes is just as important to the Act, and is
distinct from--even as it also serves-the statute's further goal of
equal opportunity to obtain political power by means of the votes
cast. Section 2 was designed at least initially to address racial ine-
qualities in the physical opportunity to cast a vote.30 Such claims to-
day are a tiny subset of the nation's section 2 litigation; but at
29. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977);
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d
246 (1lth Cir. 1987); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978); Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish
Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); see also Chandler Davidson, The
Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING:
THE VOTING RIGHTS Acr IN PERSPETIVE 24 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler
Davidson eds., 1992) ("Ethnic or racial minority vote dilution may be defined
as a process whereby election laws or practices, either singly or in concert,
combine with systematic bloc voting among an identifiable majority group to
diminish or cancel the voting strength of at least one minority group.").
30. Indeed, as far as Justices Scalia and Thomas are concerned, this is all
section 2 should ever address. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 891-946 (Thomas, J.,
joined by Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that section 2, even as amended, was
never intended to cover vote dilution, or for that matter other practices beyond
the racially selective denial of physical access to the ballot). For comment on
this extreme view, see, for example, Laughlin McDonald, Holder v. Hall:
Blinking at Minority Voting Rights, 3 D.C. L. REV. 61 (1995) ("[S]uch a view,
wholly at odds with the Court's clearly established precedent and the legisla-
tive history of the Voting Rights Act, would amount to virtual repeal of section
2."); David F. Walbert, Georgia's Experience with the Voting Rights Act: Past,
Present and Future, 44 EMORY L.J. 979, 980 (1995) (stating that the Scalia-
Thomas view of Congress's intent in amended section 2 was "without doubt,
mistaken"); Ralph G. Neas, Race, Civil Rights, and the United States Supreme
Court in the New Millennium, Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America Annual
Convention Reference Materials, July 2000 (noting that the Hall concurrence
"refuse[d] to consider Congressional actions and debates [and] would dramati-
cally diminish the protections provided by the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
overturn 30 years of precedent and at least three congressional reauthorizations
of the Act").
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bottom all violations of the Act are denials of equal access to the
voting process, and all section 2 claims are denial claims.
I recognize that "[t]he Voting Rights Act is not an all-purpose
antidiscrimination statute,"31 and this Article tries to explore the lim-
its of section 2 claims in that spirit. I also recognize that the standard
of liability for claims of denial of equal access is less clear than the
more heavily litigated standard of liability in vote dilution actions.
32
So I propose in this Article a way to understand some of what courts
do, and ought to do, in section 2 cases other than dilution. They
should and do measure nonracial justifications for challenged voting
practices precisely by the extent of their racial effects on access to
the vote. They also sometimes do, but should not, use nonracial jus-
tifications as a way of re-importing an intent element into the section
2 discriminatory results test. And they sometimes do, but should not,
apply liability criteria peculiar to vote dilution in cases where those
criteria are largely irrelevant. I will try in this Article to blend these
ideas into a liability standard that I think is workable for denial of
access cases under section 2, and then consider how that standard
might apply, not just to online voting, but to felon disenfranchise-
ment and to the uneven distribution of infrastructure that makes a
vote less likely to be counted.
B. A Review of Existing Case Law
When Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in
1982 to remove the intent requirement that the Supreme Court had
read into it in City of Mobile v. Bolden,33 it affirmed that the statute
prohibited voting procedures that had the result of disadvantaging
minority voters regardless of the motivation of the measure or pol-
icy.34 Chief among the practices that moved Congress to act was the
vote dilution alleged in Bolden, which the Court held could not
31. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491,509 (1992).
32. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
33. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 97-227 (1981) (noting that the bill that became
amended section 2 "restate[d] Congress' earlier intent that violations of the
Voting Rights Act, including section 2, could be established by showing the
discriminatory effect of the challenged practice"); see also S. REP. NO. 97-417,
at 193 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179.
[34:11711178
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be redressed under existing section 2 without proof of intent to dis-
criminate.
35
As the drafters of amended section 2 probably expected, minor-
ity vote dilution has dominated the case law under the Act through-
out the 1980s and 1990s, but again it is by no means the only sort of
wrong that section 2 recognizes. Section 2 bars the exclusion of any
voters, "on account of race, color or membership in a [protected]
language minority group," from any voting opportunity to which
other voters are admitted.36 In other words, it prohibits inequality of
access (by race) to any aspect of the voting process.37 Vote dilution
in electoral systems is of course one form-to a 1960s observer, per-
haps a novel form-of denial of equal access under section 2, but
there were and are many other instances of this general wrong. De-
nial of access could just as soon consist of a racially selective failure
to help voters physically enter the poll or read or fill out a ballot. Or
it could be the failure to make polling sites as accessible to minority
voters as they are to white voters. Other examples might include le-
gal disqualifications, unjustified on other grounds,38 that dispropor-
tionately impact minority voters, or any other racially disproportion-
ate distribution of procedural benefits or burdens with regard to
voting. And, as I will discuss further below, whereas vote dilution
actions depend on a showing that minority voters' votes as a group
are submerged, any individual voter can suffer an unlawful denial of
the chance to cast a ballot.
39
35. On remand, through extraordinary effort, the plaintiffs in Bolden proved
discriminatory intent, both as to the creation of the system in 1911 and its
maintenance thereafter. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050,
1054-68, 1076-77 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
36. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), (b) (1994).
37. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 14(b), 42 U.S.C. § 19731(b) (1994).
Under section 14(c) of the Act, the term "voting" throughout the statute in-
cludes "all action necessary to make a vote effective ... including, but not
limited to, registration,... casting a ballot, and having that ballot counted
properly... " Id. § 14(c).
38. The question of justifications for practices challenged under section 2
will take us to some of the core issues of our discussion. See infra text accom-
panying notes 77-122.
39. Obviously, a selective denial to enough members of a given segment of
the electorate-assuming such a group is politically cohesive-will effectively
deny that group its voice in the election. But proof of group effects, an essen-
tial element of dilution claims, is precisely the proof that section 2 denial
April 2001] 1179
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Indeed, both before and after the 1982 amendments, section 2
has been held to reach many practices other than minority vote dilu-
tion. Among the voting procedures challenged as denials of equal
access under a results test on grounds other than dilution have been
the following: 40 (1) the form of a referendum question on the bal-
lot;41 (2) a jurisdiction's refusal to appoint black pollworkers; 42 (3)
pollworker harassment of black voters for spending too long in the
voting booth;43 (4) a purge of all nonvoters from the registration
rolls;44 (5) the selective removal of black voters from the rolls be-
cause of unreported changes of address; 45 (6) a jurisdiction's failure
to make municipal clerks deputy registrars and to implement satellite
registration; 46 (7) a jurisdiction's limit on the number of minority
claims other than dilution do not require. See United States v. Jones, 57 F.3d
1020, 1024 (11th Cir. 1995). See generally infra text accompanying notes 53-
71.
40. For a list that includes these and a variety of other section 2 cases, see
McDonald, supra note 30, at 73-76.
41. See Lucas v. Townsend, 908 F.2d 851, 852 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated
sub nom. Bd. of Pub. Educ. v. Lucas, 501 U.S. 1226 (1991). The court of ap-
peals did not rule on whether the denial of access would be subject to a stan-
dard of proof different from that applicable to dilution, but implied that all
section 2 violations, including polling place relocations and the like, were di-
lutions because that was the harm caused to minority voters-that their oppor-
tunity to elect would be reduced. See id. at 855-58.
42. See Harris v. Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128, 132-33 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
The court did not comment on whether dilutions and other denials of access
were subject to different proofs, but quoted the 1982 Senate Report on other
devices beyond formal barriers (language that extends of course to dilution as
well) and held that the absence of minority poll officials impaired minority
voters' access because it perpetuated the appearance, dating back to Recon-
struction, that they were unwelcome at the polls. The court did not require
proof that election outcomes would be affected in the least. See id. at 132-33.
43. See Harris v. Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517, 529 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
44. See Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 824 F. Supp. 514, 522 (E.D. Pa.
1993), aff'd, 828 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
45. See Toney v. White, 476 F.2d 203, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated in
part on reh "g, 488 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1973) (upholding the findings of the trial
court that the registrar had removed from the voter rolls the names of blacks
who had not reported a change of address or who had failed to vote in any
election in the last four years, but had not removed the names of similarly situ-
ated whites).
46. See Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1268 (N.D. Miss.
1987), affid sub nom. Operation PUSH v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.
1991); see also infra notes 53-58.
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deputy registrars; 47 (8) the invalidation of black voters' absentee
ballots without individualized review;4 8 (9) a jurisdiction's failure to
inform voters of new ballot-casting procedures;49 (10) ajurisdiction's
failure to provide absentee ballots to voters;5 ° (11) the location of
polling places; 51 and (12) even the withholding of campaign finance
information and forms from black candidates.
5 2
In Operation PUSH v. Allain, perhaps the most important of this
group of cases, the district court distinguished the challenged voter
47. See Hernandez v. Woodard, 714 F. Supp. 963, 968 (N.D. 1I1. 1989).
48. See Goodloe v. Madison County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 610 F.
Supp. 240, 243 (S.D. Miss. 1985). In this case, an election board invalidated
the ballots notarized by a certain notary after four of her voters said she had not
physically witnessed them filling out the ballots. The court noted that the
board's actions may have had an effect on the outcome of the election, but that
the fundamental fairness of the electoral process was not in jeopardy; never-
theless, it acknowledged that a large number of black voters, but no white vot-
ers, were disenfranchised. See id. at 242-43.
49. See United States v. Post, 297 F. Supp. 46, 47, 50 (W.D. La. 1969)
(finding pre-amended section 2 erroneous instructions on voting equipment
prevented a substantial number of black voters from casting effective votes;
section 2 held violated despite the lack of discriminatory intent or effect on
election outcome).
50. See Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60, 64 (W.D. La. 1968) (illustrating
that section 2 can be violated due to a disproportionate benefit to white voters,
even without a finding of intent or that the outcome of the election would have
changed).
51. See Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502, 504-06 (D.II. 1982) (location
of city's polling places interacted with lower rates of minority automobile
ownership and lack of public transportation to deter minority voting and work
a "constructive disenfranchisement" in violation of section 2). Unresolved by
this case is whether enhancement can set up the same inequality. See Gilmore
v. Greene County Democratic Executive Committee, 435 F.2d 487, 491 (5th
Cir. 1970), which held that equal protection was violated by Alabama election
officials' practice of permitting literate voters but not illiterate voters to carry
sample ballots into voting booth. That practice had no rational basis and "in-
evitably impose[d] a greater burden on Negroes than whites under existing
dominant social patterns ...... Id. (citation omitted); see also James v. Hum-
phreys County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 384 F. Supp. 114 (N.D. Miss. 1974)
(practice of offering assistance to voters with visual or mobility impairments
but not to illiterate voters, where both types of assistance were discretionary
under state law, violated section 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment).
52. See Dillard v. Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471, 1472 (M.D.
Ala. 1989) (holding that a town under section 2 consent decree violated section
2 when the mayor intentionally helped white candidates and hindered the ef-
forts of black candidates).
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registration procedure from vote dilution, then held that the Senate
Report totality factors were generally applicable to section 2 cases-
dilution and otherwise-and proceeded to apply them. The trial
court took evidence of racially polarized voting, but observed in its
opinion that such evidence was "peripher[al]" and concluded "upon
reflection" that it was "not germane" to a section 2 claim against a
voter registration procedure. 53 The court took the same view of other
districting factors, e.g., a history of antisingle shot devices, unusually
large districts, access to candidate slating processes, and racial ap-
peals in campaigns.
54
Interestingly, the district court said the "ability ...to elect"
factor was among the "most important" listed in the Senate Report,
55
and cited Thornburg v. Gingles for this proposition,56 but went on to
say that the effect of the challenged registration scheme on minority
voters' ability to elect their chosen representatives was proven on a
showing that only three out of 521 black elected officials in Missis-
sippi had been elected from white-majority districts.57 The court
found the "bear the effects" factor present in abundance, and also ad-
dressed in detail the tenuousness of the state's asserted justification
for the procedure.
58
In affirming the district court's decision, the court of appeals
gave no hint that proof of effect on election outcomes would be re-
quired to establish a section 2 violation. The court considered the
claim that a state legislative remedy would fail to eradicate the dis-
parity between white and black registration rates, and concluded that
"[i]f the disparity between black and white voter registration rates
remains unreasonably distorted under the new legislation, PUSH
may undertake to establish with statistical evidence that the voter
registration procedures ... still violate [section] 2.
The PUSH court had before it a set of practices that effectively
suppressed minority turnout. We do not know whether the court
53. Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1264 (N.D. Miss. 1987),
aff'd sub nom. Operation PUSH v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991).
54. See id.
55. Id. at 1265.
56. See id. (citing Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48 n.15 (1986)).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1257.
59. Operation PUSH v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 407 (1991).
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would have applied the same section 2 liability standard to measures
that stimulated white turnout disproportionately, without affirma-
tively reducing access by minority voters; but logic suggests there is
no difference between the two. At the same time, however, it is im-
portant that a practice that makes voting more convenient for whites
than for minority voters may deny equal access under section 2 with-
out proof that it makes the election day electorate whiter than it
would otherwise be. If a showing of a racial skew of turnout were
invariably required, minority voters would have no denial claim un-
der section 2 if they overcame a convenience "handicap" that we
could all agree was unjust to impose by race as a matter of principle.
Indeed, a showing of effect on the racial composition of the elector-
ate is a small step away from a showing of effect on the ultimate
prize, that of group opportunity to affect election outcomes. If every
denial claim is made to depend on such a showing, then denial
claims, as distinguished from dilution claims, effectively cease to
exist under section 2. Thus we arrive at our central question: how
the results standard of amended section 2 applies to claims other than
dilution. Specifically, we need to know what place, if any, the test
accords (whether it should or not) to discriminatory intent or pur-
pose; and what effect must be shown even if intent is not a factor.
One case especially important to our understanding in this re-
gard is Chisom v. Roemer,60 in which the Court came as close as it
ever has-which is not very-to articulating a coherent vision of all
results claims under amended section 2. Although mostly by impli-
cation, Chisom illuminates the standards for section 2 liability in
both dilution and nondilution situations. The Court considered
whether a section 2 plaintiff, no matter what type of wrong she al-
leges, must always show an effect on her ability to elect her chosen
representatives, or indeed a dispositive impact such that the chal-
lenged practice made the difference between presence and absence of
that ability. In doctrinal terms, according to the Cison Court, there
is "only one cause of action" under amended section 2.61 That cause
of action exists to redress a single harm: the effective denial, by
60. 501 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1991) (involving minority vote dilution claim
with regard to Louisiana judicial elections).
61. Id. at 397 (stating that the opportunity to participate and elect under
section 2 is a single standard and that a plaintiff must prove both to prevail).
April 2001] 1183
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
race, of equal "opportunity to participate in the political process
[and] to elect representatives of one's choice."
62
Chisom did not decide whether a claim of differential opportu-
nity to participate-like the one a voter would have on proof that she
was physically denied access to the polls-could prevail without
proof that the challenged practice made the difference between pres-
ence and absence of a reasonable opportunity to elect. Nor did Chi-
som hold that a showing of minority voters' failure to elect proved
that the challenged voting method or practice diminished those vot-
ers' opportunity to participate. But, Chisom did hold that whenever
the opportunity to participate is diminished by race, a diminution in
opportunity to elect necessarily follows.
63
This holding becomes clearer if one considers Justice Scalia's
dissent. Justice Scalia argued that not in every case should proof of
harm both to the opportunity to cast ballots and to the opportunity to
elect candidates of choice be required to make out a section 2
claim. 64 He seemed to focus-at least in this case, whatever may
have been his larger concer 65-on voters who could not prove they
could actually elect if the wrongful procedure were enjoined. The
majority in Chisom responded on this point by saying that Justice
Scalia was mistakenly assuming that minority voting blocs could
never influence an election that they could not fully control.66 The
Chisom majority appeared to say that the requirement of harm to a
section 2 plaintiffs "opportunity to elect" would not extinguish the
claims of all those who could not prove they could elect, but their
reasoning was that proof of ability to influence would suffice in this
respect.
It seems the Chisom majority, although in pursuit of an unre-
lated aim, assumed that at least some ability to influence elections
was an element of every section 2 claim. If indeed the majority so
assumed, it remains unclear whether the Court believed that some
62. Id.
63. See id. at 403-04.
64. See id. at 407-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. This is, after all, the same Justice Scalia who, three years after Chisom,
joined Justice Thomas in urging that section 2 be construed not to apply to di-
lution cases at all. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-92 (1994) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
66. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 397 n.24.
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influence is possible, by definition, for every voter who has the
chance to cast a ballot, no matter how small his or her voting bloc, so
that diminution of "opportunity to elect" would still automatically
follow from (and would not require proof separate from) diminution
of opportunity to participate. Perhaps the Court believed that its
standard would protect those voters who could prove ability to influ-
ence or control, and that section 2 was not to be construed to care
about any other class of voters. The majority and Scalia opinions
seemed to be talking past one another on this point, and the matter
was apparently left unresolved. Chison was a dilution case, and its
result did not depend on the answer. In nondilution cases under sec-
tion 2, however, the question is quite important.
The problem is the one suggested above: If every section 2 al-
legation, dilution or otherwise, must stand or fall on proof of ability
to affect on election outcomes, then the distinction between dilution
and other denial of access cases, of which the Thomas concurrence in
Holder v. Hall makes so much, loses its meaning. It cannot simulta-
neously be true (a) that section 2 applies to denial claims in general
but not to dilution claims in particular, and (b) that every section 2
claim, whether for dilution or not, must demonstrate that dilution oc-
curs, i.e., that the challenged practice makes a cohesive minority
voting bloc consistently unable-where "but for" the wrong it would
be able-to elect its chosen representatives.
Section 2(b) construed without this distinction would, at a
minimum, extinguish per se a section 2 dilution claim that the courts
until now have not foreclosed, namely a claim based on deprivation
of an opportunity to influence outcomes rather than control them.
67
It would also generally extinguish section 2 challenges to the most
egregious-even intentional-denials of equal access, where the
plaintiffs could not show that their group could win elections absent
the denial. Even a gentler formulation, under which the challenged
practice must make the difference between presence or absence of an
opportunity to injluence or elect, would pose the same problem.
68
67. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993) (leaving the influence
question open).
68. See John A. Earnhardt, Challenging Episodic Practices Under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act: Critical Analysis of Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Of-
fice of the City Commissioners Voter Registration Division, 52 WASH. & LEE
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The difficulty seems best resolved for our purposes if Chisom is
understood to hold that burdens on the opportunity to participate
necessarily burden the opportunity to affect the outcome of elections
in at least a theoretical sense. This formulation does not split the
conjunct "opportunity to participate . . . and elect" standard of
amended section 2, since for dilution claims (which allege an une-
qual opportunity to elect without alleging inequality of opportunity
to participate) both prongs will have to be proven, whereas for denial
claims (which allege unequal opportunity to participate in the first
place) some quantum, however slight, of effect on opportunity to
elect is established on proof of unequal opportunity to participate.
69
In other words, it appears from Chisom that all section 2 claims,
at least in a technical sense, depend on a showing of effect on a
plaintiff's ability to elect; but where the alleged wrong is the physical
denial of a voter's opportunity to cast a ballot, the harm, however
slight, to that voter's chance to affect the election outcome is self-
evident. Keeping someone from buying a lottery ticket by definition
hurts that person's chance to win. Only where the voter has cast her
ballot, and claims that her vote was diluted, that is, made less effec-
tive than it should have been once cast-a challenge to the lottery's
method of selecting a winner, as it were-does section 2 require
proof of what the challenged voting procedure does to the ability of a
group of minority votes to affect election results.7 °
L. REv. 1065, 1076 n.62 (1995) ("If both conditions must be violated before
there is any § 2 violation, then minorities who form such a small part of the
electorate in a particular jurisdiction that they could on no conceivable basis
'elect representatives of their choice' would be entirely without § 2 protection.
... [A] protected class that with or without the practice will be unable to elect
its candidate can be denied equal opportunity to 'participate in the political
process' with impunity.") (citing Chisom, 501 U.S. at 409 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing)).
69. I agree with commentator Eamhardt that this is the premise of Chisom
that the majority in Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of Commissioners, 28
F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994), failed to understand. See Earnhardt, supra note 68, at
1099-100. "[T]he Ortiz majority's misunderstanding of the Chisom rule-that
burdening of political participation necessarily impairs the ability to elect and
thus violates section 2-caused it to apply the negative converse of the Chisom
rule-that without impairing the ability to elect, a challenged practice cannot
violate section 2." Id. at 1099.
70. This, at least, is the rule of the better reasoned cases. See Operation
PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Opera-
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In terms of the vote dilution holding of Gingles, a plaintiff who
alleges that her preferred candidates are consistently defeated, even
though she casts her vote the same way everyone else does, must
satisfy the three dilution preconditions-size and compactness of her
minority group, political cohesion of that group, and a degree of
white bloc voting sufficient to overcome that cohesion in most elec-
tions-before her section 2 claim can proceed under the totality of
circumstances. 7 1 But Chisom does not extinguish section 2 claims
other than the discriminatory districting at issue in Gingles merely
because the Gingles preconditions are inapplicable to those claims.
Before leaving the subject of denial claims and the Gingles pre-
conditions, let us consider one further problem. In theory, a jurisdic-
tion might be able to prove that an alleged inequality of access actu-
ally causes no harm to minority voters, or indeed benefits them, on
election day. Take the example of online voting. The "electorate
with Internet," i.e., the set of voters turning out via the Internet and
all other voting options combined, might be less polarized by race
than the electorate turning out via conventional voting methods
alone, if and to the extent that "new" Internet voters-voters who
would not have participated at all if not for the online option-were
more inclined than their non-Intemet counterparts to cross over and
vote for minority-preferred candidates. If this were true, then even if
whites were disproportionately stimulated to turn out by the avail-
ability of online voting, that might not harm minority voters' oppor-
tunity to elect their chosen candidates. Could proof of such a fact de-
fend against a denial claim, i.e., a claim that minority voters were
denied equal access to voting because they disproportionately lacked
access to the Internet? The totality of circumstances applies to all
section 2 claims, so here as elsewhere the ultimate effect on minority
voters' collective choices ought to matter. However, two important
considerations should be mentioned. First, the candidate preferences
of white voters whose turnout is stimulated should not be permitted
to justify a demonstrable impairment to minority voters' access to the
tion PUSH v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Dean, 555 F.
Supp. 502 (D.RL 1982). Not all courts are so careful to avoid irrelevant proof
requirements in denial cases. See, e.g., Williams v. Baldwin County, No. 00-
0082 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2000) (unpublished) (imposing Gingles preconditions
on denial claimants).
71. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,48-53 (1986).
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voting process, regardless of how they would cast their votes or what
influence those votes would have. Second, the possibility of a "no
ultimate harm" defense to a denial claim should not be turned into a
requirement that all denial claims must meet the bloc voting precon-
ditions of Gingles. Just because denial claims can sometimes be ne-
gated by proof that the ultimate harm to minority voters' interests is
not in fact occurring does not mean that all denial claimants must
anticipate and disprove such a defense in order to state a claim. As a
practical matter, to subject denials of equal access to the Gingles bloc
voting preconditions would give those denials, no matter how egre-
gious, a "free ride" for a period of years at least, since a plaintiff
could not proceed without evidence of election history under the al-
legedly unfair practice. I feel sure that Congress never meant section
2 denial claims to be hobbled in this way, but intended these wrongs
to be actionable from their first moment in existence.
The preceding discussion has tried to establish that denial claims
do not need to offer proof that is specific to dilution claims, espe-
cially proof , la Gingles that a cohesive bloc of minority voters
would have the ability to control or influence the election of a chosen
candidate if not for the wrong alleged. But the existing case law
mostly fails to explain just what proof is required for section 2 non-
dilution cases. So the question arises, what is the standard of liability
for such cases?
III. THE DENIAL STANDARD THAT TODAY'S COURTS
SEEM To BE USING
As may appear from the inventory of denial cases given above,
the classic section 2 denial of equal access is simply some sort of
limitation or restriction on minority-race individuals' exercise of the
franchise that whites enjoy. However, not all section 2 denials of ac-
cess are equal in the courts. The reader will not be surprised to learn
that courts stumble over the hard cases,72 and that through the cloud
72. See Winterbottom v. Wright, [1842] 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 406 (Excheq-
uer of Pleas) (Rolfe, J.) ("Hard cases, it has been frequently observed, are apt
to introduce bad law."); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400
(1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law.
For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shap-
ing the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate over-
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of those cases the applicable liability standard is much tougher to
discern.
As we try to make sense of these decisions, let us consider a hy-
pothetical. Suppose a state government sets up an investment trust.
Suppose that only qualified investors may vote for members of the
board of trustees, and that only investments of $1 million or more
qualify for deposit in the trust. Suppose there are thousands of white
millionaires in the state and only a handful of minority millionaires.
Would the investors-only restriction on the franchise for board elec-
tions violate the results test of section 2?
The special purpose of the trust seems to be important here, for
two reasons: First, its monetary gains-aside from whatever indirect
benefit the legislature thought the investments might realize for the
state as a whole-are not universally distributed, but belong solely to
the investor beneficiaries; and second, one can fairly expect people
to be more willing to invest in the trust if the decision-making board
is chosen by people with a direct stake in its decisions. In other
words, a governmental interest is present here which apparently fig-
ures into the section 2 analysis.
A state interest of some sort also seems prominent in the case-
this one drawn from life--of a landowners-only franchise for the
governing board of an agricultural district whose chief function is to
allocate water and power to area farms. In Smith v. Salt River Proj-
ect Agricultural Improvement and Power District,73 the court of ap-
peals held that restricting the franchise to landowners in such a dis-
trict did not violate section 2 merely because of the statistical
disparity between the proportion of whites and of African Americans
who were landowners.74 Even though the court was at pains to hold
that section 2 applied to special districts of the kind at issue, the
panel noted the state's interest in limiting the franchise to landowners
who had "risked their lands" to create the district and achieve its goal
of land reclamation.
75
whelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment.').
73. 109 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1997).
74. See id. at 596.
75. See id. at 591. Note that the appeals court affirmed the result reached
by a trial court whose principal rationale was that section 2 did not apply to
special districts at all. Also, the appeals court remarked on the trial testimony
of the plaintiffs' expert that "if forced to identify the variable with the 'largest
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Whatever may be the larger significance of Smith, it conforms to
the idea that denials of equal access should not be analyzed as though
they were dilutions, with a review of the Gingles preconditions and a
finding of no liability if any of them are unsatisfied.76 Smith was a
special-district case in which the court of appeals tried to chart a
middle course between invalidating the district on the one hand, and
declaring it immune to any and all section 2 challenges on the other.
To the court, the virtues of the special district simply outweighed its
vices.
Another hard case is Wesley v. Collins,77 a section 2 challenge to
Tennessee's state statute stripping convicted felons, for life, of the
right to vote. The plaintiffs' argument was that the racial disparity in
felony conviction rates meant that the disenfranchisement statute had
the same racially disparate impact, and that section 2 prohibited the
lifetime disenfranchisement of felons as a voting practice that inter-
acted with other social realities to produce a racial disparity in voting
opportunity. The trial and appeals courts held the disparity insuffi-
cient by itself to violate section 2, more or less on causation grounds:
"Felons [are not] disenfranchised because of an immutable charac-
teristic, such as race, but rather because of their conscious decision to
commit a criminal act for which they assume the risks of detention
net effect' on home ownership, he would point to 'persons per dwelling unit"'
rather than race. Id. at 590. And the court observed-oddly, since one might
have thought this was precisely the plaintiffs' case-that the appellants ap-
peared to "make no claim that the [special district's] voting system discrimi-
nates against non-landowners (nonvoters), who may disproportionately be Af-
rican-Americans." Id. at 596. For more on the possible hidden determinant in
nondilution cases under section 2, see infra text accompanying notes 94-109.
76. A handful of cases have applied Gingles vote dilution preconditions to
nondilution fact patterns, with unsatisfactory results. See Williams v. Baldwin
County Comm'n, No. 00-0082 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2000) (unpublished). The
Gingles Court recognized that vote dilution was only one type of section 2
claim, and that "Section 2 prohibits all forms of voting discrimination, not just
vote dilution." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 n.10 (1986). As indi-
cated supra, the Gingles Court understood that section 2 claims other than di-
lution would not be subject to the same standards as discriminatory districting
actions--either factors from the Senate Report or the preconditions it was set-
ting forth in its opinion. Even section 2 vote dilution claims for influence dis-
tricts, the Gingles Court held, would be differently treated. See id. at 46 n. 12.




and punishment."78 Equally important to the court of appeals was
the "legitimate and compelling" justification it believed existed for
the statute: "the state's undisputed authority to disenfranchise fel-
ons" under the federal Constitution,79 as well as the proposition, not
otherwise described or supported in the court's opinion, that "the
disenfranchisement of felons has never been viewed as a device by
which a state could discriminatorily exclude a given racial minority
from the polls."80 The court of appeals did not specifically affirm, or
even mention, the trial court's holding that "while intent need not be
shown [under section 2], the ultimate conclusion that a violation has
occurred must be tied to a finding that the scheme unfairly impacts
on the minority group-not necessarily purposefully, but at least for
reasons deemed more culpable than neutral."8'
Still another challenging example is Ortiz v. Ci, of Philadel-
phia Commissioners,82 in which the trial court noted that the defen-
dant city had an interest in cleansing its voter rolls of voters who had
not voted in some time in order to keep vote defrauders from misus-
ing those voters' names. The case turned on causation, i.e., the
causal relationship between the challenged practice and harms to mi-
nority voters' opportunity to participate, but the underlying equation
was the same: a balancing of the government's nonracial interest in
carrying out its policy against the severity of the policy's racial im-
pact. The panel majority held that a denial of equal access was not
established merely on a showing that minority voters were purged at
a higher rate, and reinstated at a lower rate, than white voters.
Rather, the two-judge majority held that a challenge to the city's
purge procedure under section 2 had to prove that the purge statute
caused the racial difference in purge rates, instead of interacting with
other social factors to bring it about, since only then would the chal-
lenged practice-rather than those other societal factors-be respon-
sible for the alleged impact on the racial composition of the elector-
ate. Since the proof demanded was impossible to produce, the
78. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1261.
79. Id. (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)) (other citations
omitted).
80. Id.
81. Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 810.
82. 824 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
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plaintiffs could not prevail. The ruling in effect imposed a require-
ment of sole or predominant causation for section 2 denial of access
cases, and thus stood on its head the "interacts with" principle of
causation embodied in amended section 283 and the pre-Bolden
84
case law on which it relied.
Although the decision in Ortiz drew heated dissent from one
member of the three-judge panel 86 and has been severely criticized as
a misapplication of section 2,87 it may be that the court reached the
right result for the wrong reasons. Even viewed from the wrong end
of the telescope, that of relief, purges of nonvoters may be
83. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
84. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
85. Of further interest is the remarkable suggestion of the appellate major-
ity in Ortiz that the only minority voters affected by the challenged purge
practice would be those who, by registering in the first place, had overcome the
socioeconomic disparities that supposedly disadvantaged them, and that there-
fore there was no section 2 harm to anyone. A denial claim that alleges a dis-
proportionate allocation of voting convenience by race should not depend on
the preexisting disadvantage to minority voters in a world without the conven-
ience enhancement, but sets that equal, and focuses instead only on the racial
disproportion of the enhancement. Compare Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F.
Supp. 1245, 1254 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (noting that voter registration procedures
resulted in lower registration rate for blacks, which denied equal access), with
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 317 (discussing socioeconomic proofs would be relevant to a
challenge to the city's voter registration procedures even though they were ir-
relevant to the purge claim). See also Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 323-24 (Lewis, J., dis-
senting).
86. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 323-24 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
87. The chief criticism is that, contrary to the court's view, section 2 causa-
tion was clearly intended by Congress to be "but-for" or contributing causation
and not predominant or sole causation. See id. at 323 ("interacts with"); see
also id. at 310-12 (illustrating that the court knew sole causation was not re-
quired, but gave no satisfactory explanation for demanding it); Eamhardt, su-
pra note 68. The Ortiz majority also left unexamined the assumption that
purges of persons who had not recently voted would have the desired fraud-
deterrent effect. The assumption is understandable, since names taken off the
voter rolls are names that defrauders cannot use. However, the court declined
to consider whether the least restrictive means of protecting against fraud
would be to purge all nonvoters, or whether there were means more narrowly
tailored to the antifraud end than a blanket purge rule. See Jeffrey Blomberg,
Note, Protecting the Right Not to Vote from Purge Statutes, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1015 (1995) (arguing for strict scrutiny of nonvoter purges under the




exceptional cases under section 2. A jurisdiction can hardly be ex-
pected to hold registrations open forever for minority nonvoters even
while eventually canceling white nonvoters' slots to keep defrauders
from infiltrating them. If jurisdictions were expected to do this, or if
purges after extended lack of contact were held per se to violate sec-
tion 2, then even the cautious no-contact removal procedures sanc-
tioned by Section 8(d) of the National Voter Registration Act of
1993 (NVRA)8 would violate section 2 on proof, likely to be avail-
able in most urban areas of the United States, that those procedures
had the same statistically disparate effect by race that the plaintiffs in
Ortiz documented for the more abrupt purge at issue in that case.
Again, what seems to be at work is the court's assessment of the
justification for the government's policy. A policy against vote fraud
is not tenuous, and the gentler the removal procedure the stronger its
policy justification. An NVRA-style removal program is presumably
more strongly justified than the shorter-term and more abrupt re-
moval procedures upheld in Ortiz. It is the same ith felons, as in
Wesley: the courts in both situations held that no matter how obvious
or severe the racial disproportion of voter removals triggered by the
challenged practice, certain policy justifications for the practice-in
Wesley5 9 the interest in disqualifying people from voting for so long
as the legislature deemed them "undeserving" of the franchise, and in
Ortiz disqualifying supposed "nonvoters" to prevent defrauders from
voting in their names--can trump it. Whatever one's view of the
merits of the Ortiz and Wesley decisions, neither is inconsistent with
the idea that the Senate Report totality factors analysis is flexible
enough to be applied in every section 2 case, dilution and nondilution
claims alike.
What proof might have led the court in Ortiz to invalidate the
challenged purge procedure under section 2? Would the result in
Ortiz have been the same if the purge notice mailings to all neigh-
borhoods over, say, thirty percent minority in VAP had been lost,
even without proof of anyone's intent to lose them, and never deliv-
ered? What if the purge statute had made it more onerous to rereg-
ister after removal than to register in the first place-perhaps, for
88. Pub. L.No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 82 (1993).
89. 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986).
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instance, by requiring reregistrants, but not first-time registrants, to
bring with them live witnesses or extra documents to prove citizen-
ship or domicile? In each case, the state's proffered antifraud inter-
est in the purge would have been the same, and the underlying dis-
parity in prepurge turnout rates by race would have been the same.
The rationale that appears to cover these scenarios best is simply
whether the stated governmental end is important and worthwhile
enough, independent enough of race, and narrowly enough furthered,
to justify the means in spite of the incidental racial effect. Such a ra-
tionale appears to confound as many of the Senate Report factors as
it elucidates, but it most certainly uses the justification factor.
On the other hand, each of the preceding hypotheticals on the
Ortiz facts seems to suppose a stronger causal relationship than ex-
isted in the actual case between the purge practice and its racially
disparate effect, and thus to take us closer to "easy" sole causation.
The analytical difficulty is finding a causal link that allows a section
2 claim to proceed against a neutral practice that has no racial dis-
parity of its own to impart, but simply transmits to the voting process
the racially disparate effect of some other social inequality. This was
the core problem that the Ortiz court seems to have found insur-
mountable.
90
One final real-world section 2 example must not be overlooked,
even though it arises from vote dilution litigation: the supposed state
interest in preserving at-large elections for judgeships, an interest in
"linkage" between a judge's territorial jurisdiction and his or her
electoral constituency. 91 The fear articulated in support of this inter-
est is that judges elected from districts will campaign from the bench,
favoring home-district over out-of-district litigants in their rulings
90. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 308-09.
91. See LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 868 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that
the state's linkage interest "must be weighed in the totality of circumstances to
determine whether a § 2 violation exists"); id. at 869 (noting that by linking
territorial and electoral jurisdiction the state seeks to "maintain the fact and ap-
pearance of judicial fairness that are central to the judicial task, in part, by in-
suring that judges remain accountable to the range of people within their juris-
diction. A broad base diminishes the semblance of bias and favoritism towards
the parochial interests of a narrow constituency. Appearances are critical be-
cause the very perception of impropriety and unfairness undermines the moral
authority of the courts.") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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out of concern for future votes, and that judges elected at large from
the entire jurisdiction from where they adjudicate will not suc-
cumb-and cannot be suspected of succumbing-to this temptation.
Federal courts reviewing section 2 vote dilution challenges to at-
large election systems for state judges have weighted this "linkage"
interest so heavily as to make it conclusive of the claim, or preclu-
sive of a remedy,92 and have even attributed the interest to states
where the states have not asserted it.
93
Again, on the surface, the Senate Report factor at work in all
these real and hypothetical examples is the relative strength or "tenu-
ous[ness] '94 of the government's justification for the policy. The
special district's reclamation purpose in Smith v. Salt River Project
Agricultural hnprovement and Power District," the claimed moral
authority to disenfranchise felons in Wesley,96 the state's antifraud
interest in Ortiz,97 and the "linkage" interest in the judges' cases98-
all of them governmental interests unrelated to race-are all non-
"tenuous" justifications in the view of those courts.
However, the reported decisions take variously evasive ap-
proaches to facts of record that suggest a disparate racial impact, ap-
parently not wishing to acknowledge such an impact only to discount
it. There seems to be a hidden determinant in operation in each of
these cases: the court's feeling, completely out of place in a results
case but nonetheless in play, about the presence or absence of inten-
tional discrimination, or at least of a tendency to "accommodate or
amplify the effect [of] private [intentional] discrimination." 99 The
92. See Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc); LULAC
v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
93. See Prejean v. Foster, 227 F.3d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 2000).
94. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982) (quoting Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485
F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) ("whether the justification... is tenuous")).
95. 109F.3dat591.
96. 605 F. Supp. 802, 810 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
97. See Ortiz v. City of Phila. Comm'rs, 28 F.3d 306, 310 (3d Cir. 1994).
98. See LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 868-76 (5th Cir. 1993).
99. Smith, 109 F.3d at 595 (citing Solomon v. Liberty County, 899 F.2d
1012, 1031-32 (1lth Cir. 1997) (Tjoflat, J., concurring)). In the judge's cases
under section 2, courts seem particularly reluctant to conclude that the deci-
sions of elected judges might be affected by the race of their constituents, even
though the "linkage" interest itself is avowedly based on the idea that unlinked
territorial and electoral jurisdictions could result in actual or perceived judicial
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trial court in Wesley came closest to making intent an explicit ele-
ment of the results test when it indicated that to support section 2 li-
ability the challenged practice must have been implemented for rea-
sons "more culpable than neutral."100
In all the cases there is the odor of racially discriminatory intent;
that is the nature of a government policy that rests on a tenuous non-
discriminatory justification. Indeed, the more-than-just-a-
coincidence feature of discriminatory result fact patterns is what le-
gitimates the circumstantial multi-factor analysis of discriminatory
intent in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp.10°
In my view, the section 2 results test does not re-import an intent
standard, even the circumstantial evidence test of Arlington Heights
or Rogers v. Lodge,102 and cannot be construed to do so without sub-
verting Congress's clear and overriding purpose in amending section
2 to remove the intent requirement. The intent test of Arlington
Heights and Washington v. Davis10 3 that was held applicable to sec-
tion 2 cases in Bolden, was exactly the limitation that Congress, in
amending section 2, was rejecting. The Court in Washington v.
Davis reasoned:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nev-
ertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in
bias. See LULAC, 999 F.2d at 868-70; Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1545
(11 th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
100. Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 810.
101. 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (describing the multi-factor test for circum-
stantial evidence of discriminatory intent in constitutional cases). Evidence as
to each factor must be considered by the court in fulfillment of its duty to make
"a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available." Id. Factors probative of discriminatory intent include: (1)
the nature and magnitude of the disparity itself (discriminatory impact); (2)
foreseeability of the consequences of the government defendant's actions; (3)
legislative and administrative history of the decision-making process; and (4)
knowledge, in that a defendant's actions would be known to have caused the
disparity or discriminatory impact which resulted from their conduct. See
Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 987-88 (11 th Cir. 1986).
102. 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982) (discussing that intent to dilute votes of racial
minority groups in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment may be inferred from
"such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available") (fol-
lowing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
103. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another
would be far reaching and would raise serious questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, wel-
fare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average
black than to the more affluent white.10
In Bolden, the Court turned to the legislative history of original
section 2 as passed in 1965 and noted that it was termed by its pro-
ponents as "'almost a rephrasing of the 15th [A]mendment."' 10 5 This
was the basis for the holding in Bolden that section 2 "adds nothing"
to claims of vote dilution under the Fifteenth Amendment. 10 6 The
1982 Senate Report said specifically that amended section 2 would
now pick up where the constitutional intent cases left off.0 7 The im-
plication is clear that racially disparate effects of neutral state voting
practices, even if those disparities were the result of larger social
inequalities and were merely transmitted onto voting by the neutral
procedure, could be redressed under amended section 2.
A significant body of discriminatory effect caselaw exists under
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.108 Although a comparison of the his-
tory and scope of effects tests under that statute and the Voting
Rights Act is beyond the scope of this Article, the housing cases as a
group are highly instructive. 109 But courts appear quite willing to
104. Id. at 248 (footnote omitted).
105. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980) (citing Voting Rights
Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 26 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Dirk-
sen and testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach)).
106. Id.
107. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 2 (1982).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1994).
109. See, e.g., Pfaffv. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739 (9th
Cir. 1996); Soules v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817 (2d
Cir. 1992); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1986); Betsey
v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984); Resident Advisory Bd.
v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 145 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. City of
Philadelphia v. Resident Advisory Bd., 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1287-90 (7th Cir.
1977) (Arlington Heights II); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233
(8th Cir. 1976); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85
(8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). See generally Frederic S.
Schwartz, The Fair Housing Act and Discriminatory Effect: A New Perspec-
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consider nonracial justifications for policies affecting voting, and our
challenge is to explain that inclination without rendering the section
2 results test incoherent or ineffective.
IV. THE DENIAL STANDARD IMPROVED?
AN INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RACIAL IMPACT AND
NONRACIAL JUSTIFICATION
The basic analytical difficulty we face in developing liability
theories for section 2 denial claims is that section 2 is said not to be
an "all-around antidiscrimination statute,"" 10 yet by its terms it oper-
ates against any practice that interacts with past and present social
conditions to result in unequal access to the vote by race, either the
physical voting process or the larger political process of electing
chosen representatives."I'
The more practices we grant that section 2 can enjoin, and the
more attenuated the causal nexus we accept as the basis for a section
2 denial of access claim, the more it appears section 2 is being used
only to combat larger social injustices, like the racial gap in income,
rather than the effects of those injustices on voting. On the other
hand, the fewer practices we say section 2 covers, and the narrower
the causation standard we apply, the closer we come to re-importing
an intent test into a statute that Congress clearly said has no intent
requirement. Somewhere between these poles is the Senate Report
multi-factor test: flexible, but how flexible? It requires proof, but
what proof in which cases? The Senate Report instructs that section
2 plaintiffs who show that a jurisdiction's minority voters are eco-
nomically disadvantaged and also that their political participation is
depressed need no further proof for a nexus to be established be-
tween the poverty and the low turnout. 11 "At the same time, the Re-
port says some number of factors will need to be proven, and says
prominently that statistical disparities between the races alone do not
suffice for a section 2 claim, for vote dilution or otherwise.
' ' 13
tive, 11 NOVA L. REV. 71 (1987) (noting that in an effects case under the Fair
Housing Act, asserted justifications for the challenged action are balanced
against the severity of the racial impact).
110. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 509 (1992).
111. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 178 (1982).




Regardless of which of the Senate Report factors must be
proven in a given case, the factors themselves are said to be "objec-
tive."' 1 4 Perhaps the least so, as we have seen, is the justification
factor, which courts have used to implement their own policy prefer-
ences in a fashion that is hardly objective. Can any check be im-
posed on this admittedly salient and important factor to make it oper-
ate more rationally?
One commentator has wondered whether the Senate Report's
justification factor might operate the way the employer's legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason does in Title VII disparate treatment cases:
by shifting a burden of production from the defendant back to the
plaintiff where the defendant shows a nondiscriminatory reason for
the disputed action. 115 In Title VII cases, the plaintiff must prove the
reason given was a pretext.
116
In fact, the Senate Report factors are never so precise as this in
their application. The totality of circumstances under section 2 is
properly a compound of all the evidence available about the voting
procedure at issue. Besides, the difference is obvious between dis-
criminatory intent under Title VII and discriminatory result under
section 2. If the proffered justification for a procedure, without
more, could presumptively free the jurisdiction from liability unless
the plaintiff proved the justification was pretextual, section 2 would
in effect be re-importing an intent requirement that Congress's over-
riding purpose in 1982 was to remove.
In response to the dilemma, I offer the following modest pro-
posal for understanding the section 2 standard when it comes to as-
serted justifications for practices, other than vote dilution, that result
in the denial of equal access: The more severe the racial disparity of
voting access that results from a challenged practice, the more tenu-
ous the justification should be seen to be, even if that justification is
asserted to have nothing to do with race.
Several points should be made about this formulation. First, it
should not be considered a substitute for the Senate Report's flexible,
114. Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,44 (1986) (stating that all section 2
claims must be proven by "objective factors").
115. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973);
Earnhardt, supra note 68, at 1092.
116. See id.
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multi-factor totality of circumstances test for section 2 violations. I
suggest it only as a partial clarification of the way the test ought to be
applied in cases other than discriminatory redistricting, where the
compactness or racial bloc voting preconditions of Gingles are not
relevant. In particular, I think it explains how section 2 should han-
dle nonracial justifications for challenged voting practices other than
dilution. The inverse relation suggested here is rather like the one
that prevails between the same two variables in discriminatory effect
cases under the Fair Housing Act.117 Indeed, those cases ought to
give valuable guidance to section 2 courts that have not previously
had to deal with the Senate Report totality test outside the discrimi-
natory districting context.
Second, courts are in fact proceeding in this manner when re-
viewing those asserted nonracial justifications for procedures affect-
ing voting, whether they so declare or not. The tenuousness factor
from Zimmer v. McKeithen118 and the Senate Report operates in just
this fashion, at least in most of the denial cases mentioned earlier in
this Article.
As a check on the validity of the inverse relationship I am sug-
gesting, consider First Amendment ballot access cases like Burdick
v. Takushi,119 or Norman v. Reed.120 In these cases, intent to sup-
press protected individual freedoms is not the issue; the courts per-
form a balancing test among the personal interests of those seeking
ballot access, the extent of the denial of access, and the governmental
interests supporting the restriction. If intent were present, there
would be no balancing test; the plaintiff would prevail. It seems that
balancing such as this is a fairly common analytical resort of the
courts where intent evidence is not available.
12 1
Third, the consideration of nonracial justifications for a disputed
action is concededly rather close to the re-introduction of an intent
requirement into the section 2 results test. Yet a distinction between
117. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
118. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
119. 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (upholding Hawaii's ban on write-in voting).
120. 502 U.S. 279 (1992) (upholding some signature requirements for
placement of candidates' names on local ballots, while striking down others).
121. Cf United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (balancing govern-
mental interest in administering the draft against the individual's expressive
interest in burning a draft card as a form of protest).
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the two exists and must be preserved. To accept intent as a required
element of proof in a results statute would be precisely to vitiate
Congress's purpose in enacting the 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act. Because of the preconditions that Gingles imposed on
discriminatory districting claims under the amended statute, those
cases have largely escaped the re-importation of an intent require-
ment, in part because courts inclined to restrict dilution claims have
been able to use the Gingles preconditions to great effect even where
bloc voting is evident by any traditional measure.' 22 But in denial of
access cases other than dilution, i.e., where Gingles's preconditions
are inapplicable, advocates and courts must take special care not to
accept intent as a prerequisite to liability. The relationship I suggest
between severity of racial impact and tenuousness of nonracial justi-
fications ought to reduce the danger of unwitting or sub silentio re-
importation, because applying the formula mitigates the need to ex-
amine nonracial justifications on their merits; the more severe the ra-
cial impact of a practice, the weaker the nonracial justification, what-
ever it is, for maintaining that practice.
Subject to these qualifications, the inverse relation described
here between the strength of a justification for a practice and the se-
verity of its racial effect seems a reasonably satisfactory way to ex-
plain and reconcile the unequal access examples given in this Article,
and the difficult instances that seem to distort the section 2 results
test as conventionally understood, or threaten its coherence.
Now let us try to apply the inverse relationship formula to our
lead example, online voting, and then to some of our "hard cases."
First, take the Internet voting problem. As described earlier, the
question is whether a new enhancement in the convenience of voting
presents section 2 denial problems if it is available only, or dispro-
portionately, to white voters. A fact finder would consider the se-
verity of this racial gap in availability against the asserted nonracial
justifications for introducing the new voting method. This brings us
to the subject of "offsets," or enhancements to existing voting meth-
ods that are designed to minimize or eliminate the gap in conven-
ience or accessibility created by the advent of the new voting option.
122. See, e.g., Lewis v. Alamance County, 99 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 1996);
Solomon v. Liberty County, 899 F.2d 1012, 1031-32 (1lth Cir. 1997); Dillard
v. City of Greensboro, 74 F.3d 230 (1lth Cir. 1996).
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As noted earlier, the Arizona Democratic Party claimed that for its
"Internet primary" in 2000, it considerably increased the number of
conventional polling stations, particularly those on Native American
reservation lands and other heavily minority areas, at the same time
as it made Internet voting available. An "offset" that the Arizona
primary did not use, but that could have operated to minimize the ac-
cess gap between Internet haves and have-nots, would have been to
limit the convenience enhancement by limiting Internet access itself,
for instance to selected physical locations where computers had
password access to the Internet site for the election. We could call
this a negative offset, as opposed to the positive offset of providing
additional non-Internet voting opportunities to those who could not
take advantage of the new online voting option. The question of fact
in either case would be whether the offsets were adequate to make
the gap de minimis in section 2 equal access terms. And though a
fact finder might find the task a delicate one, the question in theory is
relatively easy, and indeed fits rather neatly into the inverse relation
formula for justification and effects: the fewer or less effective the
offsets, the more severe the racial disparity in access, and the more
tenuous the justification for permitting the disparity to arise.
Felons present a subtler problem. The asserted justification for
disenfranchising either incarcerated felons or those who are no
longer under state supervision is the state's supposed moral authority
to keep those who break the law from choosing those who make the
law. However, even assuming that this justification is adequate to
sustain the disenfranchisement of incarcerated felons regardless of
the racial composition of the population thus deprived of the vote,
ex-felons, i.e., those who have completed their sentences, are not
covered by the justification because they are not lawbreakers, at least
to the extent that the criminal law deems their debts to society to
have been paid. And large-scale purges of supposed felons from
voter databases are still less justified, since the lawbreakers-as-
lawmakers basis for removal tends to collapse as the proportion in-
creases of persons removed who were never felons, or persons who
are erroneously slated for removal where the effort to avoid that fate
is disproportionately difficult for minority voters. 123  The more
123. See Gregory Palast, Florida's "Disappeared Voters": Disfranchised by
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severe the disparate racial impact of procedures that have weak non-
racial justifications, the more likely a court should be able to find a
section 2 violation.
Last but not least is a problem that deserves its own article: The
racially disparate allocation of error-prone voting equipment.12 4 This
is a particularly difficult example, since the allocations are almost
always defended on nonracial grounds, and the "errors" we mean are
usually those of individual voters. What made this such a hot topic
after the November 2000 national elections was the widespread sup-
position that local jurisdictions with more than one type of ballot-
casting system in use had placed their superior equipment-and per-
haps other amenities such as better telephone service, or more or
better-trained personnel-in more heavily white voting precincts,
and sent their more inferior, error-prone hardware or services to
more heavily minority precincts. The result of this allocation was
said to be a higher incidence of mis- or uncounted votes among racial
minority voters than among whites. 125 The testing of these supposi-
tions as a factual matter is beyond the scope of this article, but it ap-
pears that to some extent America's urban areas have both more an-
tiquated voting systems and more racial minority voters than
America's rural jurisdictions.
In any event, there are many types of voter errors that make
ballots uncountable. In a hypothetical zero-error system, undervotes
the GOP, NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 20.
124. This Article went to press before the Supreme Court's ruling in Bush i.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), or Ale.ander v. Sandoval, 2001 WL 408983 (U.S.
Apr. 24, 2000) began surfacing in arguments or decisions in the lower courts.
Further discussion of the potentially vast implications of these decisions will
obviously have to wait.
125. See, e.g., Editorial, "Make Voting More User-Friendly", S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, Mar. 12, 2001, at 22A (stating that reforms must "make sure pre-
cincts with large numbers of poor people and minorities... have the same up-
to-date voting machines and the same number of well-trained employees as
other precincts"); Testimony of Wade Henderson, Executive Director, Leader-
ship Conference on Civil Rights, before U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation (Mar. 7, 2001), available at 2001 WL 2005697
("The right to vote [is] guaranteed to all Americans, regardless of their race,
their neighborhood, their income, or their level of education ..... We must
acknowledge and address widespread evidence that punch-card machines and
certain other voting systems carry disproportionately-and unacceptably-
high error rates.").
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will be what they appear to be-records of voters' affirmative intent
not to vote for any candidate for that office-and overvotes will be
rejected automatically before the act of voting is complete while the
voter still has a chance to correct his or her ballot quickly, privately,
and without assistance. There are various systems in use today that
have some of these advantages, but none that has all of them. Punch
cards blindly accept overvotes and undervotes, including partial
punches, and do not alert the voter to either problem. Lever-style
voting machines accept undervotes without alerting, although for
better or worse they do not record or preserve evidence of voters'
partial attempts to record a choice. On-site scanners at precincts
might alert to over- or undervotes on optical-scan paper ballots, but
not until the card is filled out and the voter is no longer in private.
Those ballots, indeed all paper ballots, accept under- and overvotes
at the ballot-marking stage, though they advertise these problems to
any voter who examines his or her ballot by eye. Each of these sys-
tems has different recovery procedures, with different success rates,
in manual recounts: optical scans can be read manually for marks by
voters that were unreadable by machine; punch cards can be exam-
ined for the now-famous dimpled or hanging chad; and machine
ballot counts are virtually impossible to change manually, unless the
manual recount introduces errors not present before.
Assume a racially disparate pattern of resource allocation,
whether of equipment or of personnel, that results in the dispropor-
tionate likelihood that a minority voter, but not a white voter, will be
deprived of the resources necessary to prevent or correct an accred-
ited overvote or undervote. Note the distinction between this situa-
tion and a more general disparity in which votes cast in heavily mi-
nority precincts are disproportionately likely to be over- or
undervotes: in the latter the variable is performance, a compound of
voter and official action in which neither is easy to isolate from the
other, while in the former the variable is resources, regardless of re-
sult.
The section 2 equal access issue here is the extent of racial dis-
parities in the propensity of voting systems to dissuade or prevent
voters from correcting their clerical mistakes in ballot-casting. A
court reviewing a section 2 denial claim against the allocation of
user-unfriendly balloting systems ought to consider more than just
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the tendencies of white and minority voters to make mistakes in the
voting booth, since a system's dissuasive effect on voter self-
correction could introduce substantial inequalities even if voters'
rates of clerical errors were no different by race. This is a reasonable
understanding of the "interacts with" standard of section 2 liabil-
ity.126 Indeed, there may be an equal protection claim against the
same disparity under Bush v. Gore, if that decision is read to apply to
more than just presidential elections in which a Democratic candi-
date seeks recounts under the state law of Florida.1
27
Suppose a zero-error voting option is made available, and sup-
pose the claims made for the method are true-the system registers a
voter's choices without error, shows the voter's choices while there
is still time to correct them in private and without assistance, requires
the voter to confirm those choices, and does not accept overvotes at
all, or undervotes without the voter's express approval, perhaps by
means of an extra click on 'Do you really mean it?' 28 What follows
under amended section 2, if this system is made available to some
but not to all voters? Surely there is a basis to contend that the zero-
error system confers a voting advantage on those who have the use of
it, by making their votes more likely to be fully counted, and that a
racially skewed denial of that advantage to voters-particularly vot-
ers whose traditional ballots are more likely to contain errors--cre-
ates an inequality of access to the vote by race.'
29
126. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) ("The essence of a §
2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social
and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.").
127. See discussion infra at note 140.
128. No cognizable free expression interest is harmed by a system that does
not permit overvotes. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (upholding
Hawaii's ban on write-ins). Undervotes, on the other hand, are protected. See
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985);
Earnhardt, supra note 68, at 1106 (discussing state's enforcement of nonvoting
purge laws with respect to state elections).
129. Such claimants ought to be able to invoke Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525
(2000), to the same end, but Bush did not deal with different levels of accuracy
in voting or voting systems, but rather with different standards for determining
voter intent in recounting ballots cast under one system-the punch-card sys-
tem. See id. at 529. The Court in Bush did not address the question whether
voters who voted by punch card were denied equal protection because the sys-
tem they had to use was more error-prone. That question is taken up in
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Now imagine that this hypothetical zero-prror system is here to-
day in the form of online voting. The use of the Internet for ballot-
casting, assuming it indeed is effectively zero-error, affords two ad-
vantages in section 2 terms, lit makes voting more accessible as well
as more reliable. If the hypothetical racially disparate precinct allo-
cation above is applied, the result will be a doubly severe racial dis-
parity, since the advantages of online voting exaggerate whatever
advantage the "error-privileged" voters already enjoy with traditional
balloting.
If we apply the inverse relation formulation to these facts under
section 2, then the more severe the racial disparity-not of the errors
themselves, but of the allocation of hardware that objectively makes
errors harder to correct or prevent-the more attenuated is the justifi-
cation for that allocation. Indeed, evidence that error rates go up as
the minority share of precinct population increases should prompt
election officials to allocate their more error-proof hardware and re-
sources to those precincts, and should attenuate the jurisdiction's as-
serted justification for failing to do so.13
0
NAACP v. Harris, No. 1:01 CV 120 (S.D. Fla., filed Jan. 10, 2001). I suspect
the Supreme Court will distinguish the two, though I believe the distinction
would be cynical, by saying there is no denial of equal protection in a presi-
dential election where states have different systems from one another or differ-
ent systems among their own localities.
130. Compare this situation with the example of restroom design in public
buildings. If evidence shows that women take longer than men to use restroom
facilities during the typical concert or ballgame, women should have more rest-
rooms, not the same number as men and certainly not fewer, if the goal is true
equality of opportunity to use the facilities in the same available time. If this is
the goal, an affirmative allocation of more facilities to women-which seems
to favor them, but in fact merely reflects the reality that they take longer, and
thus gives neither gender "extra" or unneeded-should be used, even if state
action is not responsible for the difference in time requirements between men
and women. Incidentally, for an explanation of the difference as a factual
matter, consider the effect of generations of clothing design by male designers.
See B. Glenn George, Title IX and the Scholarship Dilemma, 9 MARQ. SPORTS
L.J. 273, 284 & n.47 (1999) (citing Taunya Lovell Banks, Toilets as a Feminist
Issue: A True Story, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 263 (1991)); see also Marc
Linder, Smart Women, Stupid Shoes, and Cynical Employers: The Unlawful-
ness and Adverse Health Consequences of Sexually Discriminatory Workplace
Footwear Requirements for Female Employees, 22 IOWA J. CORP. L. 295, 304
n.62 (1997) (citing OSCAR WILDE, Woman's Dress, in COMPLETE WORKS OF
OSCAR WILDE 945 (1989)).
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In the case of Internet voting& in order to keep substantial ine-
quality of access to voting "facilities" from infecting the voting proc-
ess, jurisdictions wishing to implement Internet voting may be re-
quired, not only to provide offsets in the form of enhanced traditional
voting opportunities for those who are Intemet-noncapable, but also
to limit the disproportionate effect of the enhancement by restricting
access to the Internet voting site to specified computers available to
all, at least until Internet access is more equalized by race than is true
today.
Congress was faced with a somewhat similar allocation problem
when it devised the NVRA.1'3 The "Motor Voter Law," as the
NVRA is still known, was Congress's effort to supersede, to the ex-
tent permissible under the Constitution, a "crazy quilt' 132 of state
voter registration procedures that often denied voters the chance to
register easily and conveniently and was judged responsible for low
registration rates across the United States.' 33 The NVRA's principal
innovation, patterned on similar initiatives in the states, was to
make voter registration available to everyone who transacted busi-
ness at state motor vehicle agencies.
The legislative assumption, of course, was that this step alone
would afford almost universal voter registration opportunities be-
cause of the almost universal propensity of Americans to visit their
local motor vehicle agency. That assumption is flawed to the extent
that car ownership is less than universal, and flawed by race to the
extent of racial disparities in car ownership. In any event, Congress
specifically found that the NVRA was not in conflict with the non-
discrimination requirements of the Voting Rights Act.' 35 But the
NVRA's proponents understood that almost-universal access to voter
registration was not in fact universal, and the NVRA accordingly
balanced its core "motor voter" provision by requiring a host of
131. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat.
77 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10).
132. See Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Soht-
tions, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1351, 1400 (1993) ("[a] major reason for the low rate of
urban voting is the nation's complex, crazy-quilt voter registration laws").
133. See S. REP. No. 103-6, at 1-3 (1993).
134. See id. at 7-10.
135. See id. at3.
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other state agencies-public benefits and social welfare agencies,
among others-to offer voter registration opportunities. 1
36
In my judgment these offsets were vital to the purpose of the
NVRA to render enhancements in the convenience of voting in an
even-handed fashion. If the NVRA had included only a "motor
voter" provision without imposing similar voter registration require-
ments on state government agencies that served those without motor
vehicle agency business-including especially the poor and the dis-
abled-it might have perpetuated or even exaggerated the access
inequalities it was purporting to remedy.
V. CONCLUSION
To whatever extent the nation's traditional and emerging voting
systems give different racial groups differing degrees of access to the
polls, they create problems that seem impossible for the Voting
Rights Act to ignore. That is, outcomes under section 2 ought to be
affected by the inequitable distribution of publicly provided benefits
and advantages in voting when that inequity affects the racial com-
position of the election-day electorate, and perhaps if it merely risks
doing so-as, for example, the prospect of "personal polling places"
for the disproportionately white class of voters with Internet access,
without equivalent convenience enhancements for the rest of us.
Courts determining liability and fashioning remedies under section 2
routinely take into account factors tending to depress minority turn-
out relative to white turnout.
137
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-5 (1994); see S. REP. No. 103-6, at 13 (1993) (re-
jecting the idea that voter registration opportunities at motor vehicle offices
would be enough by themselves to achieve Congress's purpose); see also, e.g.,
Disabled in Action v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2000).
137. In one recent well-known instance, a district court supposed that mi-
nority voters were apathetic and declined to order a redistricting remedy that
took their low participation rates into account. A panel of the court of appeals
reversed in strong language saying the minority group's lower participation
had its proven origin in the history of discrimination, in voting and otherwise,
in the locality in question and should not be held against the victims of that
discrimination. See, e.g., Teague v. Attala Co., 17 F.3d 796, 796 (5th Cir.
1996); see also Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing
dismissal of section 2 claim in part because trial court failed to consider evi-
dence that "after substantial numbers of blacks had begun to register and vote
the City moved a polling place from a location convenient to residents of black
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In all of these cases, our ability to redress the inequality may be
hampered by our limited ability to measure it. We have no easy
means of measuring degrees of inconvenience, of polling place loca-
tions for instance, and courts typically avoid the practical assessment
even as they acknowledge the theoretical problem. 38 In the Internet
case, it is difficult to measure the convenience enhancement that an
online voting option gives to an electorate whose Internet-capable
voters, for one reason or another, may be disinclined to use their
Internet access as a means of voting. I do not believe these admitted
difficulties in measuring the extent of inequalities should defeat the
concept of redress for those inequalities we can measure, i.e., those
that are clear and substantial.
139
As this Article goes to press, the nation is still uncertain what
the fallout will be of the Supreme Court's equal protection decision
in Bush v. Gore. It may be that inconsistent vote-counting standards
violate equal protection when the inconsistency is programmed into
computers, not just when it varies the "eyeball tests" used for manu-
ally recounting ballots.' 40  There arose in the aftermath of the
neighborhoods to a less convenient location farther away"); Cf Political Civil
Voters Ass'n v. City of Terrell, 565 F. Supp. 338, 343 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (find-
ing intentional discrimination in violation of section 2 and Fifteenth Amend-
ment in part because local officials had refused to open polling place conven-
ient to heavily minority southern portion of city).
138. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1971); Brown v. Dean,
555 F. Supp. 502, 502 (D.1LI. 1982).
139. Cf Report to Congress, U.S. Census Monitoring Board, Presidential
Members, at http://w3access.gpo.gov/censusmb/pres/99febl.html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2001) (rejecting the idea that statistically adjusted population counts
should not be used to correct for the acknowledged undercount of minorities
because the sampling procedures on which the adjustments are based may not
capture everyone who was missed in the original enumeration).
140. In a recent news article, Marcia Coyle, "Gauging Bush 1. Gore Fall-
out," NAT'L L.J., Dec. 25, 2000, at A4, Professor Randall Bezanson was
quoted as commenting,
Some counties program the [optical] scanners [used at polling places]
to reject overvotes .... When the ballot is rejected, the machine spits
it out and the voter, who is still present, is given a new ballot to cor-
rect the error. But other counties ... program the scanners simply to
reject the overvotes with no chance for correction. Is the inequality
between those counties that follow a different set of programming in-
structions a violation of the equal protection clause because there's a
systematic difference in the kinds of votes that are counted? It's very
hard to explain why, as a matter of principle, that isn't every bit as un-
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election a clamor for reform of the country's voting systems, though
not for the expenditures that would be required to modernize local
infrastructure. One reform that received new attention for its prom-
ise to register an accurate count at modest cost was Internet voting. I
expect that purveyors of this service will find eager new audiences
for their sales messages, and that the nation's 2000 general election
experience will only hasten calls to introduce such a system.
I am compelled to sound a note of caution: Internet voting
without protections for equal access may violate section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. However, it is conceivable that either the section
2 denial of access theory outlined in this Article or the equal protec-
tion claim ostensibly recognized in Bush v. Gore could ultimately
mean that not using the Internet-or some other uniform and error-
free electronic means of ballot-casting-is unlawful. Many years
from now it will be unthinkable to use paper punch-card ballots
anywhere, and reliable and secure electronic means of transmitting
voters intent from any place of voting to any place of counting will
be as ubiquitous and as dependable as the telephone is today, if not
more so. In that context, the use of less advanced systems will be in-
defensible either under section 2 or under equal protection. There is
no telling how soon a court will step in and hold that the time for a
more advanced uniform system has come,' 4 ' and that for anyone to
fail to implement it for poor voters as well as rich, for minority vot-
ers as well as white, is a denial of the Voting Rights Act's command
for equality of voting opportunity by race.
Our shared fascination as a nation at the birth of the Internet is
one of the great excitements of life in our time and place. It may be
that this brilliant development will change so many of our perspec-
tives that our present-day rules for political and social organization
will in a short time seem archaic, and our laws as outmoded as these
constitutional as the different [manual] recounting standards applied in
different counties in Florida.
I think Professor Bezanson has it quite right. Court challenges seeking to ap-
ply Bush v. Gore are inevitable; the question is whether principled rulings will
result.
141. Cf United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)
(holding that duty to install and use shipboard radio, once available, as an aid
to harbor navigation in fog, could not be avoided on a tort defense that its use
was not yet the industry standard).
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descriptions. Nevertheless, as we follow the course of events at the
dawn of the information age, we should not lose sight of the human
values that created the great civil rights laws of a generation ago, or
fail to heed their warnings about how the voice of the people ought
to be heard.
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